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ABSTRACT Organizational hybridity refers to the combination of multiple institutional
logics and identities that, within an organizational setting, do not conventionally
complement one another. In such conditions, organizations must develop strategies to
combine logics and sustain their hybrid forms. Success, however, is not inevitable. In this
article, we take a legitimacy-as-process perspective to focus on a failed Microfinance
Organization (MFO) in the African context of Zambia. MFOs represent a fascinating
context because of their hybrid nature and need to balance several competing institutional
demands. We utilise field interviews to analyse the process through which MFOs fail,
analysing actor legitimation responses to emerging hybridity demands. We identify three
phases associated with these changes: 1) dependent coupling, (2) misaligning legitimation,
and (3) circumnavigating over conformity. Our findings emphasise that legitimation efforts
in a failed hybrid are not simply the reverse of those that succeed. We observe adaptive
processes consistent with successful hybrids but that ultimately sow the seeds of eventual
failure. This demonstrates the need to re-think the role of legitimation strategies in hybrids
alongside their potential deleterious consequences.
KEYWORDS failure, hybrid organizations, institutional complexity, legitimation,
microfinance
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INTRODUCTION
In numerous prior studies, scholars have sought to understand how organizations
sustain their hybrid forms (Khavul, Chavez, & Bruton, 2013; Muñoz & Kibler,
2016). Organizational hybridity refers to the combination of multiple institutional
logics and identities that, within an organizational setting, do not conventionally
complement one another (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Smith & Besharov, 2019).
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In particular, prior research has paid attention to hybrid organizations that are
subject to social (e.g., poverty reduction) and economic logics (e.g., profit
making) and therefore competing dual identities because such logics are rarely
complementary (Arena, Azzone, & Mapelli, 2018; Doherty, Haugh, & Lyon,
2014; Moss, Short, Payne, & Lumpkin, 2011; Parekh & Ashta, 2018).
Therefore, hybrid organizations are typically the site of contestation, potential con-
flict, and negotiation over direction and strategy (Battilana & Dorado, 2010;
Besharov & Smith, 2014).
Consequently, numerous studies have sought to understand the strategies
hybrids adopt to deal with multiple, potentially conflicting logics. As an approach
to adaptation, ‘structured flexibility’ balances stable organizational features with
novel change processes (Smith & Besharov, 2019); ‘elastic hybridity’ can be utilised
to improve organizational resilience (Gümüsay, Smets, & Morris, 2020); other
strategies include workforce socialization (Battilana & Dorado 2010), collaborative
cultures (Reay & Hinings, 2009), and/or blending of logics (Liu, Zhang, & Jing,
2016). However, the literature to date is problematic because it implies that the
ability to be flexible, elastic, and adaptive to novel change is central to sustaining
hybridity and improved performance/survival. This suggests that failed organiza-
tions under similar conditions are either unlikely to attempt such adaptation and/
or that their failure is a consequence of ill-conceived adaptation strategies. The
absence of such an account of failure provides scope for theoretical development
into the mechanisms associated with hybridity and organizational failure beyond
current perspectives of sustaining hybridity.
To understand processes associated with failure, we focus on the legitimation
dilemmas of hybrid organizations. Broadly speaking, legitimacy concerns gaining
approval from stakeholders has been shown to be of particular importance for
hybrid organizations who have to communicate with and gain acceptance from
multiple audiences and resource holders who may have competing expectations
(Pache & Santos, 2013; Teasdale, 2010; Überbacher, Jacobs, & Cornelissen,
2015). Thus, successful legitimation strategies for a hybrid entails successfully
gaining acceptance from multiple audiences whose expectations may not necessar-
ily be complementary to organizational performance, implying that failure is likely
to concern ill-conceived legitimation strategies as an adaptive response. In this
article, we adopt a legitimacy-as-process perspective, where legitimation efforts
are a constant source of discussion, creation, and negotiation rather than an
outcome (Suddaby, Bitektine, & Haack, 2017: 24). Adopting this process perspec-
tive provides a scope for understanding legitimation strategies that do not sustain
organizational hybridity. As such, we ask: In hybrid organizations, how do legitimation
processes contribute to organizational failure?
Microfinance Organizations (MFOs) are a notable example of a hybrid. By
trying to facilitate loans to the entrepreneurial poor as a poverty reduction initia-
tive (Kimmitt & Dimov, 2020) a clear social logic exists (Yunus, 1999). However,
they also operate within competitive market contexts and are subject to business
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imperatives and thus simultaneously follow a more traditional banking logic (Kent
& Dacin, 2013; Khavul et al., 2013). The study of MFOs is dominated by success
stories and perseverance in challenging institutional contexts (e.g., Mair & Marti,
2009), with extremely limited accounts of failure (Dorfleitner, Leidl, & Priberny,
2014). Therefore, the microfinance industry represents a fascinating context for
understanding the legitimation efforts of hybrid organizations (Greenwood,
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). We focus on the case of
Christian Enterprise Trust of Zambia (CETZAM) in an emerging sub-Saharan
Africa context, specifically Zambia. We find that process is marked through
three distinct phases (1) dependent coupling, (2) misaligning legitimation, and (3)
circumnavigating over conformity. These phases are punctuated through legitim-
ation approaches – coupling and decoupling – in response to emerging logics that
challenge the core identity of the organization.
The examination of this issue forms two key theoretical contributions on
hybrid organizing, legitimacy, and institutional logics in emerging markets
(Barnard, Cuervo-Cazurra, & Manning, 2017). First, we contribute to theory on
hybrid organizing by showing the underlying processes of failure within such an
organizational form. Through our theoretical model, we observe the presence of
similar strategies identified in the literature that present the importance of flexibil-
ity, elasticity, and relational competitiveness and coexistence to sustaining hybrid-
ity (Gümüsay et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2016; Smith & Besharov, 2019) but, in the
long-term, these may have deleterious unintended consequences by over-conforming
with the expectations of key stakeholders (investors), ultimately eroding the identity
of the organization and its ability to function effectively (McPherson & Sauder,
2013). The process eliciting failure cannot be separated from decisions taken in
more stable times, where hybridity is seemingly being sustained, alongside those deci-
sions taken in more challenging crisis moments. In summary, our research implies that
a failure to sustain hybridity is not simply the reverse of succeeding to. In doing so, we
respond to Smith and Besharov’s (2019) call for further research to look at how hybrid-
ity operates when it is not necessarily a proactive choice but in a context of intensive
stakeholder demands (i.e., regulators/investors/donors in this study).
Second, by utilising ideas underpinning legitimacy theory (Lounsbury &
Glynn, 2001), we contribute to the venture development legitimacy perspective
(Überbacher, 2014) which has drawn from the concepts of ‘coupling’ and ‘decoup-
ling’ to understand how organizations align themselves with their environment
(i.e., logics) and/or strategically detach through symbolic compliance
(Überbacher et al., 2015). Although decoupling is considered an appropriate
response to institutional complexity, when such strategies become too distant
from the hybrid’s core identity it may have deleterious consequences, contributing
to Greenwood et al.’s (2011) call for greater understanding of the ‘unwitting con-
sequences’ (350) of decoupling. Therefore, by using our legitimacy-as-process per-
spective, we can highlight an alternative role of coupling and de-coupling
strategies. Rather than an approach to dyadically ‘fit’ with an audience to mobilize
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resources, they are part of a larger emergent set of activities that occur at multiple
levels and with potentially deleterious outcomes.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Organizational Hybridity
Organizational hybridity refers to the combination of multiple institutional logics and
identities that, within an organizational setting, conventionally do not go together
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Smith & Besharov, 2019). Whilst some prior research
has discussed hybridity at individual (McPherson & Sauder, 2013) and field level
emergence (Greenwood et al., 2011; Skelcher & Smith, 2015), most research in
this space focuses on how organizations combine such logics and identities to func-
tion more effectively and succeed (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Moss et al., 2011). Such
strong identities arise when there is both a salient and a clear organizational
mission, followed by alignment within its membership through symbols, images,
and narratives (Hatch & Schultz, 2002). But these are challenged when organiza-
tions combine – either strategically and/or through environmental constraints –
multiple logics and identities. In the former, organizations can pursue their own
hybridity related strategies because it can provide access to new markets and
also be a source of legitimacy, and competitive advantage (Muñoz & Kimmitt,
2019). In the latter, organizations can be forced into hybridity through environ-
mental changes such as through new regulatory discourse (Siwale & Kimmitt,
2019).
When faced with perceived constraints, organizations employ different strat-
egies to respond to emergent logics and their demands (Greenwood et al., 2011;
Gümüsay et al., 2020; Lawrence, 1999; Oliver, 1991). Organizations can be
subject to the imposition of new logics from actors such as regulators or other dom-
inant field members (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This context is what Besharov
and Smith (2014) describe as ‘contested organizations’ which exist when multiple
external demands are placed on an organization, making the prescribed roles and
actions for organizational members opaque. Consequently, successful hybrid
organizing has been shown to be a crucial response to new logic emergence that
challenges organizational identity. For example, Reay and Hinings (2009)
discuss the importance of collaborative relationships as a strategic imperative for
hybrids in a healthcare context.
However, although the literature on organizational hybridity has looked at
how the various tensions and contradictions of hybrids become resolved, leading
to enhanced performance and/or survival (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Liu et al.,
2016; Reay & Hinings, 2009), very little is known about the relationship
between hybridity and failure. Smith and Besharov (2019) discuss ‘structured flexi-
bility’ as a process involving ongoing adaptation to meanings and practices which
also requires stable organizational features; Gümüsay et al. (2020) describe a
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similar hybrid ‘elasticity’ that allows the organization to succeed and thrive.
Although these may be important mechanisms to promote the successful function-
ing of an organization, they also imply that the behaviour of failed organizations
may be unstructured, inelastic and that their failure is a consequence of ill-
conceived adaptation strategies.
The aforementioned discussion highlights two central issues currently existing
within the literature. First, prior research has focused on how hybrid organizations
are sustained to be able to perform more effectively and survive. This opens up the
question about the process that leads to the break down and failure of hybrid orga-
nizations which may be of particular issue when we shift our focus from ‘hypermus-
cular’ actors in the hybridity literature (Martin, Currie, Weaver, Finn, &
McDonald, 2017). Second, and thus relatedly, prior research depicts a relatively
static story of these ‘contested’ hybrids, assuming that once they adopt hybrid strat-
egies they either perform well or instantaneously fail, which is an oversimplificaton
of the process that exists between the development of a hybrid strategy and even-
tual failure. Prior research is dominant in the former yet very little is know about
the sets of strategic decisions made to elicit the latter. This provides an opportunity
for theoretical development.
Legitimation Strategies of Hybrid Organizations
One such strategy for hybrid organizations is the desire to legitimize with poten-
tially new stakeholders in the emergent institutional conditions (Überbacher,
2014). In general terms, achieving legitimacy means gaining approval from stake-
holders (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) in terms of ‘desirable, correct or appropriate
actions…. within some socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs and
definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: 574). Like hybridity research, the concept of legitim-
acy has focused on how organizations comply with stakeholder demands in their
environment as well as break away from them; this is argued to occur through
interactions between internal and external parties (Drori & Honig, 2013).
Subsequently, one of the main premises in legitimacy research is that the growth
and survival of organizations depends on effective strategies (Garud, Schildt, &
Lant, 2014; O’Neil & Ucbasaran, 2016).
Drawing from the legitimacy concept, research has shown different types of
practices that organizations use to convince audiences about their venture’s
‘worthiness’ and ability to survive and grow effectively in a given institutional
context (Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). Here, organizations attempt to shape
the perceptions of key stakeholders to receive support for the organization to
survive and prosper (Tracey, Dalpiaz, & Phillips, 2018; Wry, Lounsbury, &
Glynn, 2011). When confronted with competing stakeholder demands, organiza-
tions typically conform to institutional demands to maintain their legitimacy and
survival (Amankwah-Amoah & Debrah, 2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Hamilton, 2006; Liu et al., 2016). Thus, to be able to legitimize their organizations
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and survive, a large body of research has highlighted how firms adapt to fit in with
their external environments through isomorphic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or
coercive pressures (e.g., regulatory discourse) (Siwale & Kimmitt, 2019). They
must also develop internal support for any new strategic initiatives and adapt
the organization accordingly (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Drori & Honig, 2013).
Prior research demonstrates the legitimation strategies firms adopt when they
need to adapt to more than one environment. Überbacher et al. (2015) discuss
‘symbolic decoupling’ as a strategy firms adopt when they gradually want to
loosen their ties to a particular stakeholder audience with distinct logics; this
may involve ceremonial symbolism to retain ties but ultimately the organization
is striving to be autonomous and break away from the constraints of particular
audience demands. The concept of decoupling has been demonstrated elsewhere,
emphasising how organizations may engage in actions that show compliance with
new logics whilst being non-conforming (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). Whilst ‘coupling’
involves alignment with an organization’s external environment, with decoupling,
hybrids tend to endorse actions prescribed by one logic, yet they implement
approaches promoted by another; the latter is typically aligned with the organiza-
tion’s core aims (Pache & Santos, 2013).
This balance between these internal (e.g., the workforce, senior management,
board of directors) and external (e.g., investors, regulators, key suppliers, custo-
mers) aspects of the organization align with the strategic approaches of ‘structured
flexibility’ and hybrid ‘elasticity’ outlined previously in hybridity research
(Gümüsay et al., 2020; Smith & Besharov, 2019). This attests to the view of ‘legit-
imacy-as-process’ where legitimacy ‘is the product of an ongoing process of social
negotiation involving multiple participants, rather than an outcome’ (Suddaby
et al., 2017: 24). This is somewhat different to viewing it as ‘property’ or ‘percep-
tion’, where legitimacy is either a resource and an asset or an individual level
micro-perception (Suddaby et al., 2017: 24).
In a process view, legitimacy is the result of a series of interactions and is seen
as being in a constant state of ‘flux’. For example, such a temporal view has shown
how legitimacy can become socially constructed within a place in the new venture
creation process (Kibler, Fink, Lang, &Muñoz, 2015) or strategically built through
networks that may sustain organizations or lead to their demise (Human & Provan,
2000). As Suddaby et al. (2017) highlight though, the process approach is particu-
larly useful for understanding counter views of legitimacy where the study of failure
can be a ‘departing point’ from other legitimation mechanisms. For example, prior
research has detailed that when ‘deinstitutionalization’ occurs certain practices
become illegitimate, it happens through a process of continuing disruptive and
defensive institutional work by key actors (Maguire & Hardy, 2009); via a
‘spiral’ process effect between the institutional field public opinion and industry
insiders (Clemente & Roulet, 2015); or when custodian organizations deploy resist-
ance tactics (Cannon & Donnelly-Cox, 2015).
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Thus, legitimacy is seen as legitimation efforts which are a constant source of dis-
cussion, creation, and negotiation. By adopting this view of legitimation, we prise
open the possibility that the negotiation of multiple participants may not necessarily
conclude with the achievement of a positive legitimacy outcome (François &
Philippart, 2019). Prior research has typically identified a clear link between sustain-
ing the organizational effectiveness of hybrid organizations, the legitimation pro-
cesses and approval seeking they pursue (Pache & Santos, 2013; Skelcher &
Smith, 2015). To the extent that hybrids, which are difficult to categorize by key sta-
keholders, tend to suffer (Brandsen & Karré 2011; Doherty et al., 2014) whilst those
that successfully communicate their hybridity tend to be more competitive and func-
tional (Muñoz & Kimmitt, 2019; Pache & Santos, 2013; Smith & Besharov, 2019).
In this respect, through a legitimacy-as-process perspective (Suddaby et al., 2017),
the legitimation efforts of hybrids are an ongoing adaptive work in progress and
are inherently relational in terms of internal and external organizational demands
(Girschik, 2020). Our perspective suggests that whilst hybrid organizations may
develop legitimation strategies, these may be ill conceived and not necessarily
conclude with the success and survival that most literature focuses on.
In summary, given the dominance within the literature regarding strategies
and approaches to sustain and maintain (i.e., succeed) hybridity through legitim-
ation, this raises an important question as to whether the failure of hybrid organi-
zations is simply the neglect to adopt such approaches or whether this is the result
of such ill-conceived strategies. Thus, in this article, we ask: In hybrid organizations,
how do legitimation processes contribute to organizational failure? Here, survival (or
failure) may depend on how organizations ‘couple’ or ‘decouple’ their behaviours
with audience expectations whilst adapting internal dynamics to suit new strategic
aims. By taking a legitimacy-as-process view, our focus on a failing organization
allows us to understand the processes associated with gradual de-legitimising
(i.e., failing), hitherto unaddressed.
RESEARCH SETTING: MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY IN ZAMBIA
Microfinance Organizations (MFOs) have emerged as an important example of a
hybrid organization in a field that is subject to multiple logics (Battilana & Dorado,
2010; Khavul et al., 2013). On the one hand, the purpose of MFOs in this organ-
izational field is for MFOs to faciliate social objectives of integrating entrepreneurs
into the financial system and empowering their movement out of poverty (Mair &
Marti, 2006; Parekh & Ashta, 2018; Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman,
2009). To enact this ‘development logic’, MFOs facilitate access to small
amounts of credit to invidividuals who have traditionally been unable to access
the formal banking sector (Yunus, 1999). This has been associated with improved
personal finances or other poverty measures, constituting the development logic of
MFOs in this field (Copestake, Bhalotra, & Johnson, 2001; Ganle, Afriyie, &
Segbefia, 2015; You & Annim, 2014).
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MFOs thus offer micro-credit to borrowers with the expectation that they will
repay loans with interest and within an agreed period of time. In doing this, MFOs
are also subject to a ‘banking logic’ which conveys a need to meet their economic
needs by covering operating expenses, loan losses as well as the expansion of their
capital base ultimately funding future growth (Morduch, 1999). This trend of com-
mercialisation is now common in the industry. More recent research has identified
the organizational tensions that exist when MFOs look to integrate profit-driven
and poverty reduction ideals (Parekh & Ashta, 2018). As such, the development
logic co-exists with a more utilitaristic, economic banking logic which shapes
organizational strategy. For many MFOs, they use business skills and market
based approaches of revenue maximization and cost reduction to address their
development objectives in a way that is assumed to be more financially sustainable
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Nicholls, 2010; Zahra et al., 2009). However, the term
‘mission drift’ is often used in this literature to depict the tension between profit-
driven commercial logics and poverty reduction development ideal (Copestake,
2007). Thus, MFOs represent interesting examples of organizations that have
embraced their hybridity by dealing with mutliple, often conflicting logics.
In Zambia, the geographical context of this study, microfinance development
is not as notable as in East Africa by any measures. According to FinScope (2015),
financial exclusion, particularly of rural populations is still very high. Access to suit-
able finance by the low income and excluded rural population through sustainable
microfinance is important to the broader goal of addressing mass poverty.
Microfinance in Zambia has provided low-income individuals with access to finan-
cial services, thereby addressing and supporting government efforts to ensure
financial inclusion and encourage bottom-up local economic development.
Yet twenty years later, the industry can be described as young and still playing
a relatively small role in serving micro and medium businesses in Zambia. A rough
estimate of client outreach by the Association of Microfinance Institutions of
Zambia (AMIZ) puts it at less than 1 million as of 2016 (AMIZ official, July
2016). Zambia has lagged behind countries in East Africa not only in outreach
numbers but also in enacting a regulatory framework for microfinance institutions
(Brouwers, Chongo, Millinga, & Fraser, 2014). Consequently, responsible growth
and deepening financial services to Zambians was being impeded by a lack of
effective legal and supervisory mechanism for MFOs (Chiumya, 2006). For
instance, although MFOs were committed to serving the poor, this was not per-
formed in an efficient, transparent, and sustainable manner. Monitoring of
MFOs by investors to ensure institutional soundness was insufficient and disclosure
to clients was either erratic or non-existent. Given that MFOs served one of the
most vulnerable segments of the population, it was expected that these provisions
would promote sustainable growth, expand outreach, and safeguard clients from
the possibility of exploitation and abuse (Bank of Zambia Official, 2015).
Broadly speaking, the continued reliance on donor or government funds is seen
as both detrimental and unrealistic. Specifically, there has been a move toward
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sustainable, market-based microfinance by undertaking necessary regulatory
reforms and enhancing business environmental conditions.
The trend in developing countries is an increasing number of MFOs changing
from charities to profit-seeking business and adopting the status of regulated com-
mercial financial institutions (Brouwers et al., 2014; Epstein & Yuthas, 2010). To
support this change, in 2006, Bank of Zambia (BOZ) introduced the Banking and
Financial services (Microfinance) Regulations 2016 Act that provided a regulatory
framework through which credit only MFOs could evolve into limited companies
with identifiable shareholders. The Act also paved the way for the formation or
transformation of credit only MFOs into Tier I deposit taking MFOs. This institu-
tional transformation process saw some of the large developmental MFOs embark
on mobilization of voluntary savings. With the introduction of Microfinance
Regulations, BOZ intended to bring MFOs under its regulatory sphere, and
more importantly provide a smooth integration of the sector into the mainstream
financial sector (Brouwers et al., 2014; Siwale & Okoye, 2017). Interesting to note,
though, is the relatively free entry to the industry that came with the 2006 Act. The
sector was soon to include several salary-based lenders, also categorised as
MFOs.[1] Around 90 percent of the microfinance sector’s portfolio is managed
by consumption lending MFOs, which are based mainly in the big cities of
Lusaka and the Copperbelt (Bank of Zambia, 2014; Brouwers et al., 2014). As
of 2018, there were 34 MFOs licensed by the Bank of Zambia, of which 10 are
deposit taking made up of four enterprise and six consumer-payroll lending
MFOs (BOZ Annual Report, 2018).
METHODS
Data Collection
CETZAM Financial Services PLC, originally under the name Christian Enterprise
Trust of Zambia was created in 1995. It was one of Zambia’s best-known microfi-
nance institutions due to its strong social mission, rural presence and by targeting the
poor, especially women. CETZAM makes an interesting case study because of its
successful transformation from an NGOMFO into a for-profit MFO (hybrid organ-
ization) in 2006, then deposit taking in 2010 before its collapse in May 2016. First
and foremost, we focused on collecting interview data. This took place in July 2015
while CETZAM was still operational but in deep crisis. The second stage of field-
work took place in July/August 2016; two months after the regulator – Bank of
Zambia – had taken possession of CETZAM. The intention was to find out how
the leading stakeholders then accounted for its failure. Therefore, over the period
(July 2015–August 2016), we conducted 20 in-depth semi-structured interviews
with 12 individuals. As eliciting an expert perspective of failure was important, 11
of these research participants in Table 1 had been involved with the MFO or the
sector for over 10 years, and all could relate to both the field’s complex set of
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logics and dynamics. In addition, all senior managers had been actively involved in
managing CETZAM up to the year it collapsed. Out of 12 interviewees, seven were
interviewed at least twice (see Table 1). Because it was important to get a bigger
picture of the state of the local microfinance sector, interviewees 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
and 12, were external to CETZAM. It was particularly important to elicit the ‘multi-
plicities’ of the failure situation following Mellahi and Wilkinson’s (2004) guidance,
to take care not to obscure any emerging differences between how leading stake-
holders later accounted for it, although some resisted doing so.
Questions with informants from CETZAM normally started with their general
impression and observation of the institution’s niche in extending financial services to
microenterprises and the poor, then proceeded to identify the most important events
they believed accounted for its failure. As previously outlined, we adopt a
‘legitimacy-as-process’ perspective (Suddaby et al., 2017) which brings a broad
view to our attention where legitimation is viewed as an interaction between multiple
organizations and individuals. Thus, our data collection did not imply that the
organization had achieved legitimacy with various stakeholders but that their strat-
egies and decision-making reflected efforts to do so. Interviews with external infor-
mants started with what they thought about the regulatory environment, interest
rate caps and how it had affected the sector or performance of their MFOs. In
reflecting on capping of interest rates and its effect, the discussion would then natur-
ally lead into CETZAM’s fate. Typically, interviews lasted between forty-five
minutes and two hours, mainly conducted face-to-face and audio-recorded, unless
the interviewer objected to audio recording. All but two interviewees were recorded
and subsequently transcribed after the researcher completed the fieldwork.
Table 1. Research Participants
Interviewee Position Frequency interviewed
1 Senior officer (I) (3) July 2015, October 2015 (via Skype), July
2016
2 Senior officer (I) (2) July 2015, August 2016
3 Middle manager (I) (1) July 2015
4 Middle manager (I) (1) July 2015
5 Middle manager (I) (1) July 2015
6 Former main shareholder of CTZ (I)
External participants to failed MFO
(2) August 2016, March 2017 (response to
follow-on questions by email)
7 Microfinance local expert (1) July 2015
8 Director-AMIZ (umbrella network body
for MFOs)
(2) July 2015, August 2016
9 Microfinance specialist at Bank of Zambia
assigned to our study
(2) July 2015, July 2016
10 CEO of one of the leading MFOs (2) July 2015, August 2016
11 Head of credit of a non-deposit taking MFO (2) July 2015, August 2016
12 Acting CEO of a deposit taking MFO (1) July 2016
Note: (I) denotes an internal participant drawn from CETZAM
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Second, we focused on the construction of a timeline from the events
described by respondents and informant validation. We developed a detailed nar-
rative, and utilised data collected at different points in the organization’s life, with a
particular focus on ‘critical events’ within the timeline of the process – those
instances that are salient, important or essential and require unusual attention
from which inferences can be made (Morgeson, Mitchell, & Liu, 2015). By focusing
on these clearly observable events, we balance the necessary time ordering of such
events against the notion that certain events and their outcomes are subjectively
attributed as meaningful and relevant to organizational actors in a multitude of
ways (Suddaby, 2010) e.g., a firm attributing performance to external conditions
rather than their own managerial issues. At this point in the process, secondary
data were particularly critical in reconstructing and discussing historical events
thus reducing bias. Secondary sources such as newspapers, Bank of Zambia’s
annual reports on the sector’s performance and CETZAM’s 2013 annual report
were examined to aid the analysis. This diversity of data from various sources
allowed triangulation of our explanation and facilitated a deeper understanding
of the organizational setting.
Data Analysis
In terms of analysis, we focused on the identification of emergent themes through
abductive data analysis (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Tavory &
Timmermans, 2014). Abductive analysis involves iterating between data and
extant theory in order to theorize about the case organization and explain key pat-
terns and events. The abductive analysis process involves the interplay between
grounded inductive (data) insights and deductive theoretical ideas (e.g., Muñoz
& Kimmitt, 2019). This approach is particularly important when attempting to
understand emerging constructs or relationships such as the interplay between
hybrid organizations, legitimation and failure in this article (Timmermans &
Tavory, 2012).
In the first part of this analytical process, we focused on the transcribed nar-
ratives and key events in order to identify the most relevant events for the timeline
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). In order to make sense of this process story, we
adopted a temporal bracketing strategy to our analysis (Langley, 1999). As such,
we were able to identify key periods in the process of failure related to logic emer-
gence and decision-making i.e., notable changes in organizing principles, informal
rules of action and interaction that guide this field (Thornton &Ocasio, 1999). This
involved identifying critical sources of progression within the timelines where the
process seemed to be entering a new phase of development (Langley et al.,
2013). This temporal decompisition was identified when obvious changes
became apparent in logics that the organization was responding to e.g. the shift
to commercialise the MFO sector through new legislation with a clear banking
logic embedded within it.
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We were then able to focus on understanding the key legitimations strategies
that related to the emerging hybridity. Such a temporal decompisition improves
the robustness of process theorising by improving the accuracy of interpretation
(Langley, 1999). Simultaneously, this first part of the analytical process was to iden-
tify salient emerging themes within these temporal brackets in an inductive
manner. The second part of this type of abductive analysis involved moving
between our inductive insights and extant theory. In particular, we utilised
Besharov and Smith’s (2014) notion of logic compatibility and centrality to under-
stand where and when the environment was becoming more institutionally
complex, how it was having an impact on the MFO (internally) and the subsequent
legitimation strategies (externally-oriented) required in response. Compatibility
draws our attention to how the direction of the hybrid is being accepted internally,
whilst centrality draws our attention to externally oriented mission and strategy
decisions that have resource and reputational implications. This structure is
reflected in Figure 1.
The literature on hybridity, legitimacy and microfinance was used to guide
the stepwise abductive analysis that can be found in Table 2, highlighting the
inductive and subsequent deductive development across existing theory (Gioia
et al., 2013) i.e., reflecting on and making decisions regarding our coding structure
through this existing literature. Given the temporal bracketing strategy in the
research, we were then able to represent our data structure through a process
model which depicts the three phases identified in hybrid organizing failure.
Figure 2 represents the internal and external aspects previously discussed which
Figure 1. Data structure
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Table 2. Abductive analysis




. External pressure to expand
. Active donor participation
. Use of group lending
methodology
. Rapid growth
. High numbers of active clients
Building a core mission
⇒ The organization has a core focus on
achieving its social mission.
Aligning the workforce
⇒ The workforce and leadership are
aligned in the core goals of the
organization
Sector pressures of MFO expansion (Dixon et al., 2006)
NGO MFOs prone to risky decisions (Galema et al.,
2012)
NGO ‘world order’ (Fowler, 2000)
MFOs established to tackle poverty through entrepre-
neurship (Khavul et al., 2013)
Low centrality and high compatibility produce harmo-
nious organizations (Besharov and Smith, 2014)
Logics created between organizations and beneficiaries
(Venkataraman et al. 2016)
Dependent coupling
. 2006 Banking Act
. Change of legal status
. Donor to commercial investor
relationships
. New luxurious offices
. High levels of PAR
. Legacy behaviours/fraud
. Compromise in lending
methodology
Strategic de-legitimation
⇒ The organization de-legitimizes from
key field members and aligns with new
field logics
Contradictory workforce culture
⇒ The workforce and leadership are mis-
aligned in the core goals and of the
organization
Importance of funder oversight and environment
(Christen et al., 2003)
Market principles dominate NGO behaviour (Lewis,
2017)
Banking logic displaces development (Kent and Dacin,
2013)
Taking actions to endorse environments and audiences in
emerging logic (Pache and Santos, 2013)
Retain structure and be flexible to external demands
(Smith and Besharov, 2019)
Shareholder model designed to improve financial sus-
tainability and outreach (Mersland and Strøm, 2008)
Organization’s symbolically de-couple from old audi-
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Table 2. Continued
FIRST ORDER CODE DESCRIPTION AND⇒ SITUATIONAL FIT DEDUCTIVE INSIGHTS
AGGREGATE
CATEGORY






. Debt spiraling & defaulting
. Interest rate capping
Segregated leadership
⇒ The leaders of the organization unable
to integrate multiple logics.
Mission crisis
⇒ The organization has lost focus on
achieving either it’s social or financial
mission.
Leaders in hybrids attempt to integrate logics (Battilana
and Dorado, 2010)
Members reject strategies that are inconsistent with
history, tradition, and identity (Humphreys and
Brown, 2002)
Regulatory logics effects resource access (Khavul et al.,
2013)
Lack of agency and inability to blend logics (Currie and
Spyridonidis, 2016)
Tension between founder and ‘insider’ shareholders
(Hartarska and Mersland, 2012)
High centrality and low compatibility produce contested
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appear tightly coupled at the beginning and gradually pull further apart through
organizational decline.
RESULTS
Based on the analysis, we deduce three unique phases, which capture events, action
and processes leading to the failure of the organization. In this findings section, we
present the story of MFO failure and present each phase by showcasing codes asso-
ciated with the strategic legitimation responses to emergent logics. As previously
articulated, the results follow the structure of the interplay between internal and
external aspects of the organization as they try to sustain and develop their new
hybrid form. As depicted in Figure 2, the three phases highlight initial tight ‘coup-
ling’ when the organization is in relatively harmonious times and internally coher-
ent. The model depicts how these internal and external elements get pulled apart
through ill-conceived legitimation strategies.
Phase 1: Dependent Coupling
In the first phase, we highlight what we label as dependent coupling which showcases the
alignment between the internal values of the organization and how these were
‘coupled’ with the expectations of other key stakeholders, something which ultimately
elicited a dependency upon those field-level stakeholders. Whilst the term ‘coupling’
refers to the degree of alignment with a targeted environment (Überbacher et al.,
2015), we identify how this coupling produced a dependency on stakeholders
within that environment. This ‘coupling’ of building a core mission and aligning the workforce
aimed to legitimise the MFO in its initial years as they worked towards the stake-
holders’ (donors) and organization’s core mission of poverty alleviation. In
Figure 2, the thick arrow depicts this coupling as producing relative organizational
harmony with internal and externally oriented features being synchronized.
Building a core mission. At the founding of the organization, the logic of development
and poverty reduction was the focus of the microfinance industry, guiding the legit-
imation practices of the MFO around its core mission. At this stage, the tensions
that come with hybridity were non-existent as the MFO was mainly guided by
this social need to reduce poverty through microfinance services. When it was
founded it had an expressly strong vision to fulfil a social agenda driven by
Christian principles to transform the lives of the poor by providing opportunities
to create employment and generate income through credit and training services
(Dixon, Ritchie, & Siwale, 2007). This reflected the values of its founder
members who sought to use the Christian biblical framework to shape a threefold
(economic, social, and spiritual) transformational development. Talking to one of
the founder members in 2016 and in a follow-up email in February 2017, it was
pointed out that:
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We really started as a private enterprise with corporate ideals embracing social
concerns that would be transformative. I, and some other people invested per-
sonal money before donors came on board. Our vision was to serve poor com-
munities by providing access to credit to finance and grow their
microenterprise…. [but] CETZAM was not a donor agenda at all, but that
its social focus appealed to donors who were ready to partner and give financial
support to drive the poverty agenda. (Informant 6)
The original founders had poverty alleviation as their main goal, which conformed
to development oriented international organisations like the Department for
International Development, UK, and led to CETZAM transforming into a non-
government organisation (NGO). This clear social mission was key in the legitim-
ation attempts by CETZAM to these active stakeholders (donors), who at the time
defined and shaped the local and international microfinance industry. To stay true
to its internal ideals of meeting the needs of micro-entrepreneurs at the base of the
pyramid, the traditional group-based lending methodology was deemed appropri-
ate for rapid outreach to low-income entrepreneurs. Thus, building a core mission
refers to how the MFO communicated itself to these external stakeholders to
gain their acceptance.
In 1998, the UK’s Department for International Development, in partnership
with international organization ‘A’ (anonymised), released funds through ‘A’ to
manage CETZAM and the supporting donor had even earmarked it for massive
growth to serve as a model for a registered national bank by 2005 (Dixon,
Ritchie, & Siwale, 2006). As an MFO with NGO status and backed by abundant
donor funds, its legitimacy and authenticity were ‘given’ and became a platform for
its rapid growth. For example, Dixon et al. (2007) note that, its branch network had
grown to 12 in less than five years and by end of 2002, it could boast over 16,000
Figure 2. Process model of hybrid organization’s failure
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active clients, up from 9,390 in 2000. By local standards, CETZAM was regarded
a market leader and enjoyed great success as measured by client numbers, branch
networks and impressive repayment rates (Copestake, 2002). It is here that the
development logic of poverty reduction is at its most apparent and largely uncon-
tested in the institutional field. This is reflected in CETZAM’s legitimation prac-
tices, through their core mission and growth strategy.
Aligning the workforce. In response, the organisation’s funders, the institution together
with loan officers focused on massive outreach in terms of the poor accessing loans.
Whilst building a core mission refers to how the MFO communicated its core vision to
donors, aligning the workforce refers to how that external donor relationship shaped
the activities of members of the MFO. For CETZAM to operationalise its core
mission, field level employees (loan officers), managers as well as donors’ actions
were all aligned to this logic of poverty reduction. This was consistent with the
bigger goal of fighting poverty and not so much with institutional financial sustain-
ability. But, within CETZAM, there was pressure to expand their operations to
satisfy the expectations of donors and therefore ensure that future access to
funds could be secured. Thus, organisational practices developed internally to
meet the needs and desires of donor funding as a means to securing CETZAM’s
financial future. To achieve that, one informant in hindsight noted that:
Group lending then, for CETZAM as an NGO contributed 80% to the loan
portfolio size. This lending methodology was intended to target the poorest of
the economically active-mainly women as per donor preference then of support-
ing women rather than men in fighting poverty through microenterprises. So,
loan officers mainly followed women marketeers to facilitate microloans and
meet agreed client targets. (Informant 4)
Another added:
Internally the organisation set targets for its loan officers that focused on repay-
ment performance, a key variable for donors that were funding us at the time.
(Informant 1)
Given the relationship between CETZAM and funders, this demonstrates how it
shaped the day-to-day role of organizational members. Donors funding
CETZAM pushed loan officers to focus on loan repayment, as opposed to a more
tailored personal relationship that involves officers providing additional support to
low-income entrepreneurs. This was also entirely focused on female entrepreneurs
rather than a broader range of individuals experiencing income poverty.
This influential donor role appears to be because of CETZAM’s financial
dependence on donor funding, as articulated below:
So CETZAM’s performance as an NGO had been fluctuating and each time the
company went down, it was because of a poor loan book. When the loan book
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got bad, we would receive funding from donors and go back up again and even
forget about the bad loans we had not collected. Therefore, it became a cycle; go
down on account of bad loans, get donor funding and get back up again! This is
how it was when it operated as an NGO. (Informant 2)
This ‘cycle’ is encapsulated in our code aligning the workforce which implies that
donors had a powerful influence over decision-making within the MFO, shaping
the practices of loan officers who were simultaneously focused on massive outreach
and reducing the risk of the portfolio by increasing repayment rates. This cycle was
then complete when donors continued to fund the organization despite poor finan-
cial performance, insisting on a further set of conditions for this finance. Thus, the
influence of donors, to whom legitimacy was important for the MFO, was to align
their needs with the activities of the workforce (loan officers, branch managers,
senior management).
Thus, we label the first phase of the process as dependent coupling. Through build-
ing a core mission the MFO communicated the values and intentions of the organiza-
tions to key stakeholders (donors). But through aligning the workforce, we see how that
particular external relationship shaped some key organizational activities. Whilst
‘coupling’ is a relevant strategy for gaining acceptance from such key stakeholders,
the extent to which these stakeholders had an impact on organizational life engen-
dered a dependency. This points to an old ‘world order’ (Fowler, 2000) within
international development which had a principal focus on beneficiaries, poverty
reduction and the role of donor partners (Venkataraman, Vermeulen,
Raaijmakers, & Mair, 2016). This was consistent with the strategic decision-
making of the MFO at that time as they responded by rapid scaling that defied
natural ‘organic’ growth supported by internal controls. Consequently, the work-
force (loan officers and branch managers) were tasked with increasing outreach to
as many entrepreneurs as possible under the premise that improving access to
financial services was critical to poverty reduction, irrespective of the outcome.
Ultimately, the coupling associated with their legitimation engendered a depend-
ency on those donors for whom they financially relied.
Phase 2: Misaligning Legitimation
In the second phase, we highlight what we label as misaligning legitimation which com-
prises of strategic de-legitimation and a contradictory workforce culture. Where new logics
have now emerged within the field, this phase emphasises how the MFO
‘decoupled’ themselves from previously crucial donor relationships to align itself
with the behaviour of for-profit entities like commercial banks under the new
banking logic (strategic de-legitimation), ultimately undermining their ability to func-
tion effectively. The ‘misalignment’ occurs through the de-legitimation of previ-
ously vital relationships and focus on a new commercial path under the banking
logic to gain legitimacy from commercial investors, this led to the emergence
of a workforce culture no longer befitting of its new organizational form.
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The emerging tension with the hybrid organization is depicted by the thinner
arrow in Figure 2 which shows initial internal and external oriented elements
beginning to pull apart and become incongruent.
Strategic de-legitimation. The first phase for CETZAM ended with the introduction of
the 2006 Banking and Financial Services (Microfinance) Regulation Act. The new
act fell under the conventional field of finance introducing a new logic based on
profit maximization allowing NGOMFOs to transform into shareholding compan-
ies and become licensed with the Central Bank for supervision purposes. Based on
this Act, CETZAM moved to a shareholder ownership structure and later
became subject to regulations by Bank of Zambia, the national financial regulator.
This represented the first major piece of institutional work in the industry – the intro-
duction of a banking logic into a sector previously dominated by the development
logic, with donors as its main stakeholders. To adapt to the new environment
‘CETZAM Opportunity’ became ‘CETZAM Financial Services Ltd’, reflecting
the redefined logics in the institutional field. This change effectively necessitated
that CETZAM turn into a hybrid organisation, meaning that legitimation efforts
needed to be tailored to a new audience: commercial investors. Thus, as
CETZAM evolved into a for-profit private company (while holding on to its
social mission), it was confronted with a new identity and approach to organizing
that advanced a view of poverty reduction occurring through growing sustainable
‘for-profit’ organizations. Thus, a core focus on poverty reduction was under
threat and in practice, CETZAM started drifting towards the new commercialised
banking logic at the expense of its founding ideals.
In responding to the 2006 Act, the trustees of CETZAM as an NGO became
shareholders of the ‘new’ private for-profit company and set in motion decisions that
aimed at de-legitimising from the donor relationships which were so crucial to accessing
resources in Phase 1. However, the actors (management, shareholders and the board)
were rather quick in ‘adapting to fit’ (Suddaby et al., 2017) with the banking logic. For
example, soon after converting to a private company, decisions were taken to move
their head office to expensive luxurious office buildings, they applied for a deposit
taking license with Bank of Zambia and worked on a complete cut with donors with
regards to shareholding and initiated financial relationships with commercial investors.
In each of these actions, informants made the following observations:
After converting to a private company, we moved our head office. But all these
moves led to increased fixed costs- that were not necessary. For example,
CETZAM occupied two and half floors of Mukuba House at a very high cost as
this was a high-class building. But you see, head office doesn’t generate money,
so money from branches was being used to sustain luxury offices! (Informant 3)
In 2008 CETZAMapplied to be deposit taking and this created excitement and
the thinking was that, we will be a bank and thereafter all will be plain selling. I
think it was a mistaken belief that it was going to be rosy and easy. (Informant 2)
19The Failure of Hybrid Organizations
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The International Association for
Chinese Management Research
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/mor.2020.70
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 81.151.201.213, on 17 Mar 2021 at 13:30:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
Another added:
We were affiliated to donor A and at some point, they even offered to take over
CETZAM by buying out the same trustees who had become shareholders, but
shareholders didn’t allow that to happen. They shot the offer down. (Informant 1)
So, when it came to funding operations and loan book CETZAM decided to
contract short term commercial debt until the time it could attempt to raise
capital from the stock exchange. For example, in 2008 CETZAM issued commer-
cial papers which were subscribed to, and also initiated borrowing from commer-
cial financial institutions outside Zambia such X and Y. Consequently, we
contracted huge debts with several commercial lenders. (Informant 2)
The main requirement of the 2006 Act was that NGO MFOs become share
holding companies with most shareholders being local. To apply for a deposit
taking license was not required under the new regulations. Indeed, one external
informant wondered why CETZAM rushed into it:
I think the regulations have been quite flexible in the sense that it was not com-
pulsory to be deposit taking and was left open as to which tier an MFI could
apply for. Each MFI had an option. (Informant 10)
As for complying with shareholding requirements, again CETZAM is said to have
missed an opportunity to consider the implications of its hasty decision to decouple
itself completely from donors that had been very active in shaping and funding its
activities under the development logic. To re-emphasise the implications of de-
legitimising with donors, one CETZAM shareholder stated:
the relationship with donor A was broken and CETZAM lost that “big brother”
oversight. Somewhere along the line, A was no longer in the picture. The with-
drawal of that supervision and financial support had huge consequences on the
viability of CETZAM’s business. (Informant 6)
Here we see how the environment for the MFO has changed, bringing with it new
legitimation dilemmas as they tried to seek new pathways to financial performance
beyond their prior reliance on influential donors. But new investor relationships
were purely profit driven and the important organizational oversight from
donors was lost, detrimental to the organization. Thus, the data highlight the stra-
tegic de-legitimation of the MFO – an effort to decouple themselves from previously
influential stakeholders (donors) and to mimic the behaviour of commercial
banks (e.g., luxurious offices, deposit taking) to legitimise themselves and align
with a new audience: commercial investors. We describe this as strategic to dem-
onstrate the deliberate nature of the MFOs direction.
Contradictory workforce culture. The gradual decline of the poverty reduction ethos and
decoupling from donors created inevitable internal tensions with respect to how far
CETZAM would remain true to its original social mission. Consequently, the
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social ‘face’ of the hybrid identity began to diminish too, with the workforce experi-
encing a new form of work culture much of which was inconsistent with the culture
in which they had been socialized under the NGO era. We label this here as a
contradictory workforce culture. This associated internal tension with the work of
employees is exemplified through loan officers who had to balance the previous
ethos of nurturing, caring and advising for low-income entrepreneurs against the
new ideas of viewing clients as ‘customers’ with a pure focus on outreach,
growth and profit of the MFO. Although CETZAM quickly took on a new identity
as demanded by the Act, management on the other hand, did not seriously address
certain legacy behaviours of staff that were at odds with this new logic. In hindsight,
one key informant noted that:
CETZAM carried with it the culture that characterised it as NGO. We moved
across with everything donated and the mind-set of employees unchanged. The
culture, which you find in an NGO set up, is very different from when you are a
profit-making company. So, the NGO mentality was deeply entrenched so that
people (workers) believed that we will get money regardless. This culture was so
embedded that CETZAM struggled to change. (Informant 1)
This perspective seems to suggest a dissonance between the old imprinted culture
and that of the new environment. The new commercialised microfinance world
demanded change, but in practice, much of CETZAM’s work ethos remained
unchanged, indicating a degree of inertia from the MFO. One informant that
had been with the MFO since the onset of its transformation and reflecting on
the struggle to adapt mindsets, noted thus:
being a limited company by shares means that sustainability of the organisation
becomes the focus, whilst as an NGO sustainability is not viewed by most people
as priority even though internally you might have that in mind as a key objective.
So, while you might have the social mission and sustainability, people’s view is
that social mission is paramount and even internally the work ethic is more on
the social mission than sustainability. (Informant 5)
The legacies of the past continued in less obvious ways to have sway on how
CETZAM would organise itself, compete and survive. For example, some loan
officers as well as managers and board members continued to act as if they were
still under the donor driven era (development logic) where survival was based on
access to grants:
You can try to employ newcomers, but as long as you leave even just two old
ones, they would start influencing the new arrivals or ‘inducting’ them in their
‘old ways’ of doing things. (Informant 2)
Basically, CETZAM’s strategic plan didn’t put much emphasis on cultural
change-there was no significant investment into it. I would say that efforts to
change the old NGO culture were not sustained long enough to permeate
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worker’s mind-sets. Somehow even some senior managers and the board
believed that we will still continue to receive some of the donor funding.
(Informant 3)
The narratives above suggest challenges hybrid organisations with a strong social
mission might face in orientating and aligning their employees’ ethos and that of
management and shareholders to market based logics. Whilst this suggests
inertia in terms of organizational adaptation, from the point of view of the loan
officers, it actually shows resistance to these changes from loan officers who
wanted to focus on relationship development with entrepreneurs rather than as
a client that needs to meet their contractual obligations.
In summary, the second phase highlights what we label as misaligning legitim-
ation. In new conditions of competing logics, the MFO took on the form of a
hybrid organization. Through strategic de-legitimation, the MFO opted to decouple
from its key stakeholder relationships, endorsing symbolically (e.g., luxurious
office buildings) the new commercialized banking logic. Ultimately, this strategic
decision had a knock-on effect on its ability to transition into a stable functioning
hybrid organizational form. This inability to transition is exemplified through the
second dimension in Phase 2 – contradictory workforce culture. Thus, the symbolic
nature of the decoupling seemed to permeate the organization’s internal function-
ing and undermine it.
Phase 3: Circumnavigating over Conformity
By Phase 3, the logic of banking rather than development was now central to the
functioning of the industry. We use the label circumnavigating over conformity to empha-
sise how the MFO over conformed (i.e., legitimated with) to the requirements of
the banking logic, to the extent that they no longer bore resemblance to either a
functioning MFO or a commercial bank. Thus, they were an organization in
mission crisis which was being hamstrung by segregated leadership, whereby senior man-
agement and shareholders couple with the new direction of commercialisation
despite its obvious deleterious consequences. We refer to this as ‘circumnavigating’
over conformity because of how the leaders avoided the core issues at the centre of
the organization. The fractious nature of the organization is depicted by the thin
dashed arrow in Figure 2 which shows internal and externally oriented elements
being pulled apart.
Segregated leadership. Following Battilana and Dorado’s (2010) work on the integra-
tion of logics among organizational leaders, we use the term segregated leadership to
demonstrate how leaders in CETZAM made a series of decisions in the framing
of the banking logic with deleterious consequences. The management and share-
holders made decisions, knowingly or unknowingly, that had serious repercussions
on the life of the organization and potentially precipitated failure. First, the deci-
sion to implement the deposit taking status of CETZAM, then the choice of
22 J. Siwale et al.
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The International Association for
Chinese Management Research
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/mor.2020.70
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 81.151.201.213, on 17 Mar 2021 at 13:30:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
funding sources, third, the application for a PLC status and be listed on the stock
exchange and lastly, the approval of a dividend pay-out. Each of these decisions
were undertaken as a legitimation effort with the external audience but came at
a great cost and internally conflicted with CETZAM’s original social mission.
In 2010, Bank of Zambia approved the application for CETZAM to start
receiving public deposits. This was a huge boost to its growth as public savings
were expected to be a cheaper alternative source of funding. However, to take
on a deposit taking status called for huge investments in physical infrastructure
and human resources as required by regulations. In response to being deposit
taking, an informant revealed that:
…they [senior management] beefed up management positions like internal
audit and marketing section expanded as planned to brand the company like
a bank to attract deposits. Other departments were created as a result of the
deposit status even though the net benefit was limited. (Informant 3)
Mobilization of public deposits was perceived as status enhancing and legitimacy-
building (François, & Philippart, 2019), reinforcing the banking logic and regarded
internally as an inexpensive source of funding relative to commercial loans (Louis,
Seret, & Baesens, 2013). However, at issue here to their legitimation approach was
the corporate image CETZAM wanted to portray which later became unsustain-
able as the leaders went an extra mile by opening a premier branch close to their
head office in Lusaka. They thought this would be their flagship for the new iden-
tity (bank). An informant of the organization noted that:
This branch was refurbished to high standard and to make a statement that we
were now a bank! All this euphoria pushed up operational costs and I think we
didn’t quickly manage this process properly. (Informant 5)
Regrettably, this move did not go as planned as the following quote shows:
I think that setting up a bank like branch was more of a gamble. It didn’t work and
the branch was empty most of the time. There was an assumption that clients will
follow us if we are visible to them. Deposits didn’t automatically flow in antici-
pated amounts as most of the clients we served were not able to keep their
savings for long so we could use them to fund our loan book. (Informant 2)
In 2011, one year after their deposit taking license approval, the company con-
verted into a PLC with a view to list on the stock exchange and later that same
year a decision was made to pay out dividends. These two decisions would
further emphasize the extent to which management and the board went to over-
conform to the banking logic; with consequent devastating effects on its finances
as one interviewee noted:
So, with this, we thought, we could start trading on the stock market, thereby
raising more capital. However, 2 years later, our financial figures were no
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longer attractive and so we couldn’t go ahead with our plan because the
company was in red. In the end, the plan was shelved but a lot of money had
been spent preparing documents required by the Stock Exchange
Commission. (Informant 1)
One of the requirements for listing on the stock exchange was for the company to
show they were profitable and with a history of having paid out dividends.
Therefore, CETZAM made a big dividend pay-out in its quest to list on the
stock exchange and obtain resources directly from the market to raise more
capital, further exemplifying their over conformity to the banking logic imperative.
This move would surprise many, as CETZAM was not yet strong enough finan-
cially to declare a dividend.[2] Financial performance at the time was noticeably
below expectation and huge losses of $2.8 m had been recorded against a profit
of $236,363 in 2012 (2013 Annual Report: 6). If the company was running such
a thin layer of profits, why did they declare dividends? In conversation, one of
the interviewees would reveal the reason:
These shareholders put so much pressure on dividends being made even though
the company was in a dire situation. (Informant 2)
However, more importantly, another informant further noted:
This was done so as to have a history and also serve as a good sign to investors as
well as help the company register with the stock exchange commission.
(Informant 1)
Thus, the payment of dividends was principally to signal investment readiness to
the commercial financial and banking sector. Interestingly, discussions with
former senior managers revealed the dividends were paid out with the approval
of majority of shareholders and the board. Other actors (internal and external),
however, viewed this action differently. For example, one shareholder noted,
‘the decision to become a PLC, register on the stock exchange and dividend
pay-out compromised bottom-line issues’. An external source also added:
I think the board took their eyes off the threats facing the organization and got
on with ensuring the organization met the requirements for listing on the Stock
Exchange. (Informant 7)
Through segregated leadership, we see how senior leadership interpreted the banking
logic that was now widely accepted within the industry. But rather than pursuing a
strategy of integrating both logics together they opted for a segregated approach
that focused entirely on aligning with the now dominant banking logic.
Mission crisis. By the final phase of the process, the MFO was an organization
experiencing mission crisis – it was no longer meeting either its social or financial
objectives. For example, rural branches were closed or scheduled for closure,
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while loan officers under pressure to generate income, started chasing clients that
would borrow large amounts, scaling up and preferring individual loans to group-
based loans which tend to be smaller. CETZAM also started tapping into invoice
financing and salary-based loans to boost their incomes:
As an institution, we had to respond to these changes and as a result we have
over time shifted from relying more on group-lending to individual lending.
Currently, CETZAM is focussing more on individual than group lending, and
20% of our portfolio is lent to salaried individuals. (Informant 4)
The aim was to make the income statement attractive, so we changed focus
and went for SMEs and invoice financing. This means we went for less risky
and bigger volume clients. (Informant 2)
Up to this point in the life of CETZAM as a private company, the deposit-taking
venture had disappointed and social funders were hard to come by. So CETZAM
intensified its strategy of tapping into external debt, further heightening its social
mission conflict. Records from its 2013 annual report show debt spiralling from
$1.4 m in 2010 to $1.9 billion in 2014, against a deteriorating loan book-suggesting
a downward spiral in the quality of its core business. A well-placed informant indi-
cated that by end of 2013, warning signals were flashing as over 40 per cent of the
loan book was non-performing. Thus, for a company whose past growth was
funded by donor money, relying on external commercial debt was a fundamental
shift and one that would become an enduring challenge:
CETZAM resorted to external borrowing as equity didn’t come through exist-
ing shareholders. So, we had no choice but to tap into debt financing and this
source of financing became a huge burden for the company. (Informant 4)
In desperation, actors responded by borrowing huge amounts of money with a
view to growing the organization’s loan book but ended up using most of it to
plug other financial ‘holes’ in its operations. In addition, CETZAM went on to
acquire another rural based MFO, so they could use its rural focus to attract
social funders. But this strategy failed too because the MFO was loss making at
the point of purchase and only added to CETZAM’s deepening financial crisis.
As of 2015, a worrying picture was emerging within the organization having
had to deal with an interest rate cap on annual lending interest rates in the previous
two years. Revenues had significantly dropped, debt had spiralled, number of
employees reduced to 95 from 140, with plans to further reduce to 50 by end of
2015. Its loan portfolio had significantly gone down, with its financial position
described as dire. In response, a decision was taken to move offices to a cheaper
alternative (residential house), a move that failed to portray the corporate image
they had previously embraced. This action, while laudable, came too late to
make an impact on finances, leading CETZAM to halt its lending as pressure
from creditors over non-loan repayments was mounted. Management were
quick to blame their situation on external conditions such as the direct intervention
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by the regulator through interest rate capping. One of the senior managers made
the following remark after asking him to comment on the institution’s progress:
CETZAM has not been growing as expected and much as I would like to say we
have made progress; the reality is our growth has been negatively impacted by
regulations-especially the ones introduced in 2013. To be honest, CETZAM is
struggling at the moment and the contributory issue is the regulating of the price
(interest rates). (Informant 1)
Later that year the Central Bank also acknowledged that interest rate caps had left
a devastating effect on the sector (BOZ, 2015 Annual Report). However, a former
senior official who was contacted after CETZAM final collapse in May 2016,
noted that the organization struggled to cope with change and went on to summar-
ise the major issues as; poor governance, unmanageable debts, funding problems,
mission conflict between commercialization and social goals, and inappropriate
regulations. Linking all these themes together is CETZAM’s over conformity
with the dominant banking logic in the industry and inability and unwillingness
to tackle core organizational challenges.
In summary, the final phase of the failure of CETZAM demonstrates an
organization experiencing significant conflict; something we label as circumnavigating
over conformity. Through segregated leadership, senior management failed to develop
structures and practices that could have enabled selective coupling (Pache &
Santos, 2013: 973) aspects of their social logic with those of the banking logic.
Instead, they over conformed to the now dominant banking logic. This precipi-
tated what we label as mission crisis and the circumnavigation (i.e., avoidance) of
the core issues at the centre of the organization. Reflecting on CETZAM’s story
and its end position, one of its founders made a soul-searching remark regarding
its dissolution:
My point is that the whole CETZAM saga lost me money and lost donor money.
Most importantly, we lost the capacity to serve poor communities- that was the
whole reason why we did CETZAM. (Informant 6)
DISCUSSION
In this article we ask: In hybrid organizations, how do legitimation processes contribute to organ-
izational failure? Through our examination of a failed microfinance organization in
Zambia, our study identified a three phased process associated with failure, organ-
izational hybridity and legitimation dilemmas. As a phased representation,
Figure 2 is inevitably a simplification of the messy process of interactions we outlined
in the results; filled with feedback loops, contestations, moments of hope, potential
recovery, and other incidents. We do not mean to imply a natural progression
from phase to phase. It emphasises critical moments where the logic emphasis and
strategic responses alter as well as the cascade effect of internal and externally
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oriented decision making over time. This cascade effect also shows how the hybrid
moves from tight ‘coupling’ when the organization is in relatively harmonious times
and internally coherent. The model depicts how these internal and external elements
get pulled apart through ill-conceived legitimation strategies.
The article makes two key theoretical contributions. First, we contribute to
theory on hybrid organizing, which seeks to understand the adaptive processes
of organizations who experience multiple and often contesting institutional
logics. To date, prior research has focused on these strategies and adaptive pro-
cesses as a way of understanding how hybrids sustain and strive under such pres-
sures (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Yet, very little is known about the processes
associated with their failure, with extant literature implying that failure may be
the result of an inability to pursue strategies that are flexible to change and
promote organizational resilience (Gümüsay et al., 2020). Figure 2 points to a
more complex picture where such adaptive processes are part of the eventual
story of failure, sowing the seeds for the organization’s eventual demise. Thus,
we contribute to theory by highlighting that processes associated with failure are
not merely a reverse of strategies that lead to sustaining hybrids.
By adopting our approach to a failed organization, we demonstrate how the
path to failure for a hybrid organization may be forged before the organization
embraces hybridity. We observe that this occurs through dependent coupling but
later becomes exacerbated by strategies of misaligning legitimation and circumnavigating
over-conformity. Prior research has identified the relevance of ‘structured flexibility’,
hybrid ‘elasticity’ and simultaneous competitive and coexistent relationships
(Gümüsay et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2016; Smith & Besharov, 2019), amongst
others, as key strategies to adapt to competing logics. However, we observe
similar adaptive and flexible responses to new stakeholder demands (Phase 2)
and therefore demonstrate that the strategies failed hybrids adopt are not simply
the reverse to those which allow them to succeed. As Figure 2 highlights, we see
this flexibility particularly at the juncture between Phase 1 and 2 where the
demand for organizational adaptation was at its height. We would propose that
a ‘hyper’ flexibility to stakeholder demands (i.e., over conforming) may elicit the
deleterious internal organizational strife that CETZAM experienced. In short,
such strategies currently discussed within the literature should be considered as
the beginning of an open-ended process of contestation and negotiation, and
within the context of fields where norms, values and routines may vary.
In contrast to previous hybridity studies, our findings cast light on a context
where the demands of external stakeholders (e.g., regulators, investors, donors)
are particularly powerful and thus hybridity is not necessarily a proactive
pursuit; rather it is predominantly a response to demands of external actors.
However, our findings should be further contextualised when considering the
underdeveloped nature of the microfinance industry. In mature fields (e.g., health-
care, Reay & Hinings, 2009), there exists a strong understanding of roles, relation-
ships and routines (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) and therefore organizations
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converge and conform to a clear set of expectations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In
less mature fields such as the microfinance industry or among social purpose coop-
eratives, (Muñoz, Kimmitt, & Dimov, 2020), for example, these roles, relation-
ships, routines and organizational templates are less clear and iteratively
emerging because of how they challenge incumbent practices. For example, the
failure of CETZAM involves multiple iterative developments with regulators
regarding what they believe microfinance to constitute (i.e., non-profit activity
or work of formal banks). This lack of cross-sector understanding in the field
enables heterogenous interpretations for what form such an organization may
take. Thus, this article emphasises that the configuration of influential external sta-
keholders in an emergent industry field context can make strategic choices seem
clear in the short term (i.e., legitimise) but that may have deleterious consequences
in the long term. As such, this article offers a specific call for research from
Besharov and Smith (2019) into reactive strategic choices of hybrids.
Second, to understand the relationship between hybrid organizing and
failure, we utilised ideas underpinning legitimacy theory (Lounsbury & Glynn,
2001) and therefore contribute to the venture development legitimacy perspective
(Überbacher, 2014). In this domain, the processes of ‘coupling’ and ‘decoupling’
are viewed as critical to the legitimation processes of firms in institutionally
complex conditions (Überbacher et al., 2015). In particular, ‘coupling’ concerns
how an organization symbolically tightly aligns itself with certain audience
frames to gain approval, whilst ‘decoupling’ implies a loosening from such stake-
holder expectations so as to gain autonomy. However, our findings point to a
more complex picture as hybrid organizations shift their attention between audi-
ences for legitimation purposes.
As we adopt a legitimacy-as-process perspective (Suddaby et al., 2017), we
can highlight an alternative role of coupling and decoupling strategies. In Phase
1, we observe how tight alignment with stakeholder demands may produce a
dependency and a ceding of power to some vital organizational practices whilst
Phase 2 highlights how such strategies can misalign the hybrid between its internal
characteristics and externally oriented legitimation efforts. In the legitimacy litera-
ture, ‘decoupling’ is viewed as a logical strategic response to organizations trying to
‘fit’ with multiple audience expectations. But such a view implies that legitimacy is
mainly a commodity utilised by organizations to improve their success/survival by
gaining the approval of other – a more deterministic ‘legitimacy as property per-
spective’ (Suddaby et al., 2017). Thus, we contribute to the legitimacy literature by
demonstrating how coupling and decoupling strategies are part of a set of emergent
activities that occur within a multi-level process and with potentially damaging
consequences (Langley, 2007).
Further, Phase 2 and 3 highlights how such strategies can misalign the hybrid
through its internal (e.g., workforce culture) and external features (e.g., strategic
de-legitimation). Thus, we respond to Greenwood et al. (2011: 350) call for
improved theoretical language in understanding the ‘unwitting consequences’ of
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decoupling strategies. Whilst coupling and decoupling relates to the strategic man-
agement of an external audience, if the firm cannot implement and adapt to these
new directions internally then such strategies are likely to be ineffective. This
implies that, in the study of hybrid organizations, researchers should be particu-
larly cognizant of both internal and external legitimacy, hitherto underrepresented
in legitimacy research (Drori & Honig, 2013). Because of the diversity of expecta-
tions facing hybrids, coupling and decoupling strategies are likely to be crucial in
balancing shifting institutional logics against organizational identity.
Such hybrid forms, however, may be susceptible to this internal and external
misalignment than other organizational forms. This misalignment seems to be
crucial in the understanding of failing or ‘illegitimate’ (Maguire & Hardy, 2009)
hybrid organizations. Although there is a growing body of organizational failure
research, the literature on the negative consequences of legitimation is sparse
and concerns a broad macro-level view of deinstitutionalisation (e.g., Clemente
& Roulet 2015). However, using the ideas of coupling and decoupling we can
connect the negative consequences of legitimation with organizational dynamics
and their ill-conceived strategic responses to new logics and audiences.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Building on the above and reflecting on the limitations of our research, there are
opportunities for future research. In this article, our legitimacy-as-process view
rests on the assumption of equifinality (i.e., there are multiple paths/routes to
achieve legitimacy and sustain hybrids). Thus, we believe there are likely multiple
paths to success/failure that will share features with our context but also differ; this
will require an understanding of how multiple organizational strategies work
together (Yunzhou et al., 2016) but for both positive and negative outcomes.
One fruitful methodology to examine these multiple paths is fuzzy set qualitative
comparative analysis that highlights causal complexity and configurations asso-
ciated with relevant outcomes. Future research is needed to understand the
causal configurations of success/failures in organizational forms and the diversity
of legitimation strategies. Given the industry focus in this paper, it would be worth-
while for research to explore these configurations across the microfinance industry
and within multiple institutional regimes (Muñoz et al., 2020) but also in other not-
for profit and social enterprise settings where emerging market institutions mould
organizational forms and strategy (Lan & Galaskiewicz, 2012). In addition, whilst
this research casts light on a particular extreme case, further research is needed to
understand the organizational decline of microfinance institutions. In this article,
we draw from a ‘legitimation-as-process’ perspective (Suddaby et al., 2017)
which means we do not assume legitimacy as an outcome. Indeed, illegitimacy
may be a more pertinent outcome for failed organizations. Future research
would benefit from such a perspective which would incorporate corroborative
‘audience’ data to substantiate legitimacy or lack thereof.
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CONCLUSION
To conclude, this article sought to understand the relationship between organiza-
tional hybridity, legitimation dilemmas and failure. Through a temporal examin-
ation of failed hybrid in the emerging microfinance industry in Zambia, we have
highlighted legitimation strategies of hybrids and their deleterious consequences.
Such strategies, however, resonate with ‘flexible’ approaches to organizational
adaptation currently understood within the literature. Consequently, our findings
point to such strategies as the beginning of an open-ended process of contestation
and negotiation where the seeds are sowed for later failure. We believe this offers
an important account of hybrid organizations, logics and legitimation in the emer-
ging microfinance industry in Sub-Saharan Africa.
NOTES
[1] The MFO sub-sector is categorised into enterprise-lending and consumer-lending MFOs.
Accordingly, where 80% or more of an MFO’s total loans are to micro-enterprises, such an
MFO is categorised as enterprise-lending MFO (BOZ, 2014)
[2] Efforts to have the dividend per share disclosed failed, but one shareholder in a follow-up email in
early 2017, indicated it was a huge pay-out and shareholders made a lot of money out of this at
the expense of the company’s portfolio growth.
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